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Politicians in white coats? Scientific advisory committees and policy in Britain. 
 
The LSE GV314 Group1 
Abstract 
Do scientists advising government in scientific advisory committees (SACs) in the UK fit the 
traditional model of offering substantive scientific advice to improve the quality of policy making, 
are they forums for policy making and negotiation where “the science” is tempered by broader 
political concerns, or are they simply bodies that legitimise policies already decided upon? The 
traditional “on tap” model and its alternatives imply differences in how the agendas of SACs are put 
together, how committees deliberate and how they influence policy, and these implied differences 
are explored on the basis of a 2015 survey covering the experiences and attitudes of 338 members 
from 46 scientific committees.  The traditional model holds up rather well against models that see 
SACs filling broader political roles such as policy deliberation and legitimation. The findings suggest 
that the organization and procedures of SACs indeed allow scientists to offer advice largely without 
having to engage with or anticipate wider policy considerations and constraints, and that 
government “steering” or otherwise leading SAC deliberations toward politically desired conclusions 
is rare. 
  
                                                          
1 The LSE GV314 Group consists of staff and students in the Department of Government at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science following the undergraduate course ‘Empirical 
Research in Government’ (course code GV314). Involved in this project were Esma Akkilic, Molly 
Brien, Becca Brooks, Louise Busson, Sabiha Chagpar, Kirk D’Souza, Taran Dhesi, Azim Juzer, Polchate 
Kraprayoon, Olivia Na, Edward C Page, Laura Price, Gareth Rosser, Alice Thompson and Costa 
Thrasyvoulou. 
Politicians in white coats? Scientific advisory committees and policy in Britain. 
There is a central conflict in the role of the scientist in government.  The official position is 
that the scientist contributes the scientific evidence but the policymaker weighs the evidence with 
other considerations and makes the policy decision: an “on tap but not on top” view of the role of 
science (see Hoppe and Wesselink 2014: 74).  The practicalities are, however, that the world of 
policymaking is ultimately political and scientists might be expected to have to adapt to this world if 
they are to make a valuable contribution to it.  Among other things they are asked to use their 
judgment on issues where scientific evidence is sparse or inconclusive and offer views on the 
likelihood of one proposed remedy for dealing with a problem being better than another.  They are 
expected to argue the case for their view of the scientific evidence in a committee setting with other 
scientists and possibly also civil servants, lay people and interest group representatives.  Trickiest of 
all they have to convert an “is” to an “ought”; a view or understanding of the science has to become 
transmuted into a suggestion or recommendation for action.  This apparent conflict, the adaptation 
of scientific modes of reasoning and behaviour to political policy environments, lies at the heart of 
some of the most influential discussions about the role of the scientist in government, including 
Collingridge and Reeve’s (1986) analysis of the conditions under which “science speaks to power”,  
Jasanoff’s (1990) “Fifth Branch” of government or Pielke’s (2007) “Honest Broker”.  The conflict 
accounts for the  problematic nature of the "border work" or “boundary roles” of scientists 
straddling the worlds of policy and scientific research (see Jasanoff 1987; Fischer and Leifeld 2015). 
 
As Spruijt et al (2014: 23) suggest in their meta-analysis of the field, "research on expert roles 
has remained mostly theoretical" such that it is still possible, seventy years after Robert Merton 
called for it, for an article taking as its central thrust the argument that "more research" in the field 
was needed could still be published in a major policy science journal (Fischer and Leifeld 2015).  
Much of the existing evidence about how such boundary roles are negotiated derives from the 
analysis of, or experience derived from, a particular committee or small set of committees (but see 
Bijker and Hendricks 2009; Rimkuté and Haverland 2015). In this paper we explore the balance of 
scientist-policy maker roles across a range of scientific advisory committees (SACs) in the UK on the 
basis of a survey of over 300 members.  SACs are formalised bodies, and formalisation brings with it 
relatively fixed memberships and procedures and the likelihood of developing enduring norms of 
behaviour. To what extent do the procedures and norms in scientific advisory committees support 
the "on tap not on top" model? 
 
On tap, bit-part policy makers or under the thumb? 
In order to consider this question we must first establish what alternatives exist to the “on 
tap” model for SACs.   One obvious alternative is the “on top” model, with scientific advisory 
committees being a vehicle for groups of technocrats to shape public policy decisions.  While such a 
view reflects one broad strand of thinking about science and policy, it has not featured significantly 
in much recent writing about how science and policy routinely interact and we do not propose to 
focus our attention on it here, although we will revisit our decision briefly in the conclusion.  More 
significantly, recent literature has focussed on two alternative “political” models of the role of SACs 
which see them as on the one hand policy legitimating bodies or on the other, policy bargaining 
bodies, each implying a distinctive role for scientists on them. 
 
The policy legitimating function of such bodies is suggested by Rimkutė and Haverland (2015) 
who distinguish between the instrumental “problem solving” roles of committees and their political 
roles of “substantiating” (giving weight to policy choices already taken) and “legitimising” 
(persuading others that policy decisions have merit).  Dunlop (2010) approaches a similar set of 
ideas from the perspective of principal-agent theory when she explores two main political functions 
of advisory committees: “efficiency”, here defined in a specifically political context where the 
“advice delivered by the agent contributes to the satisfaction of the principal’s policy preferences”,  
and “policy credibility”, referring to establishing “citizen confidence” in policies.   
 
A policy bargaining function of such bodies is suggested by the work of  Krick (2015) who, in 
addition to endorsing the importance of a legitimizing role, suggests that some scientific committees 
also serve as forums for policy bargaining between a variety of social interests in which the 
“scientific” content of the conclusions or recommendations is diluted, if present at all.  If  a large 
proportion of SACs have non-scientists on them, her conclusion for what she terms “hybrid” 
committees might be expected to apply to SACs.  The advice hybrid committees produce is “not 
scientific or academic advice, with its air of objectivity. … Rather, it is the outcome of a process of 
negotiation and aggregation of different positions that rests on competing experiences, 
backgrounds, values, convictions and perspectives and refers to a variety of validity norms, such as 
policy usefulness, social fairness or scientific rationality.” (Krick 2015: 489; see also Timotijevic et al. 
2013). 
 
We can set out a series of expectations arising from each of these three approaches to 
understanding how SACs work. Our first task must be to establish how far the “policy bargaining” 
role role more normally associated with “hybrid” committees might be expected to apply to SACs in 
the first place; this means establishing whether the composition of many such committees allows 
the possibility of policy bargaining and negotiation among diverse actors.  Then we can go on to 
examine the evidence supporting these three different roles as they apply to the work of SACs.  We 
propose to do this by focussing on three broad stages of the process of handling issues in SACs; the 
agenda setting stage, the progress of  committee deliberations and at the post-decision or “impact” 
stage, where the recommendations meet the wider policy world.  
 
We can outline a range of features of SAC activity that one might expect to find associated 
with each of these three roles.  The roles are not symmetrical or entirely mutually exclusive, so the 
features associated with them are not simply analysed by focussing on one or two dependent 
variables; we are here concerned with setting out how far the way SACs work is consistent with each 
of these three models (Table 1).   
 
Starting with the agenda setting stage of SAC work, one would expect, broadly speaking, with 
the “legitimising”  and “policy bargaining” models, that  governments  would be particularly 
concerned with using SACs to handle broader policy issues; above all, those in need of scientific 
legitimacy or dialogue with social and economic interest representatives.  The “on tap” model would 
see government consulting scientists on a wide range of matters, displaying no particular interest in 
placing on their agendas matters concerned with  broad policy objectives as opposed to details of 
policy elaboration and implementation.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
The deliberative stage offers perhaps the clearest opportunity to examine the three roles 
directly; under the “on tap” model the deliberations and outcomes are shaped by “the science”;  by 
technical-scientific criteria and debates.  If the “legitimising” role were important in how SACs work 
we would expect to find significant evidence of government steering SAC deliberations, perhaps 
through the secretariats of the committees or the civil servants who attend them.  For the “policy 
bargaining” role to be significant in SAC work we would expect those committees with 
representatives of outside interests on them to have their advice shaped by scientists bargaining 
with these interests or even anticipating their reactions by using broader social or political criteria to 
shape their advice. 
 
At the impact stage these models do not of themselves generate any particular expectations 
about the frequency with which  government follows the advice offered by SACs.  Low take-up of 
recommendations could reflect failure to agree the science, to legitimise or to broker policy 
compromises;  high take-up could reflect the opposite. High or low take-up is not inconsistent with 
any role.  However, each of the three roles lead us to expect different types of advice to be more 
likely to be followed.  For the “on tap” model the degree of scientific consensus might be expected 
to be closely associated with high impact.  With the “policy bargaining” model, by contrast,  we 
would expect that external stakeholder agreement would be associated with high impact.  With the 
legitimising model we would expect to see advice more closely congruent with subsequent 
government policy (that is to say  it is “followed” even though the advice was something of a 
formality) where government itself has had a strong hand in creating the advice and steering SAC 
deliberations.  
 
UK scientific advisory committees and the survey 
It is not possible to say exactly how many SACs exist, not least because what constitutes such 
a committee is not clear, despite the fact that government occasionally publishes lists of them (a 
2010 compilation lists 72, see BIS 2010).  They have a variety of names including "panel", "subgroup" 
and "council"). Some have extensive structures which include further committees and 
subcommittees.  A committee might have no fixed membership, schedule of meetings or precise 
role (e.g. the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies).  Bodies not generally considered "scientific 
advisory committees" give scientific advice to government, including regulators such as the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Mintrom 2014; Abdolla 2009).  Some are difficult to find out 
about; the Scientific Advisory Committee on the Medical Implications of Less Lethal Weapons does 
not divulge details of its membership in order, as it explains in one report, to avoid threats to and 
lobbying of members (SACMILL 2104: 8).  Many other committees do not give details of membership 
online.  In late 2015 it was possible to identify 83 separate organisations that described themselves 
as advisory committees although we could only find membership details for 46. Our survey was 
based on a mailing enclosing a link to an online survey (through the Qualtrics service) to 618 email 
addresses from the 46 advisory committees described on the website www.gov.uk as scientific 
advisory committees for which membership details were available. Where the same individuals were 
members of more than one committee, we chose randomly which committee we would ask them 
about.  53 emails were returned as undelivered.  The 565 delivered emails generated 338 valid 
responses, indicating a response rate of 60 per cent. This is very encouraging in the light of one 
recent survey of scientific advisers  to EU bodies that managed only a 28 per cent response rate 
producing  120 responses (Rimkuté and Haverland 2015: 439). 
 
While one can doubtless find examples of science-policy relations that fit almost any model, 
we are interested in offering an account of the mass of routine interactions between science and 
policy as institutionalised in SACs as measured by a survey of members drawn from all such 
organisations.  This method contains its own problems and biases.  Our survey looks at the self-
reported behaviour and observations of members of SACs.  Such data is subject to potential biases 
about which we can say rather little but hypothesise a lot.  Scientists and other members may have 
an interest interest in conveying a particular image of themselves and how committees work in 
order to avoid cognitive dissonance or even to avoid repercussions on their roles as advisers or even 
their careers.  To be weighed against this possibility of bias is the possibility that a survey can say 
something about a broader range of advisory committees than would be possible with any feasible 
study design (through case studies or in-depth interviews) aimed at avoiding the potential bias of 
self-reported behaviour. It is certainly difficult to imagine how one can understand the relationship 
between scientific advice and policy without understanding the context of particular policies or 
pieces of advice in a way possible mainly though the case studies that constitute much of the 
evidence in this area.  However, it is not our intention to explain or understand the whole 
relationship between science and policy but rather cast light on one particular institution: the 
scientific advisory committee.  We will consider in the conclusion whether other evidence in the 
field suggests that our findings might be challenged on the basis of the bias arising from self-
reported behaviour and observations.  
 
We also need to add that the survey is based on the individual as the unit of analysis.  In 
order to sustain our claim to anonymity we could not ask questions about the specific committee to 
which individuals belonged, as questions such as those covering age, gender, scientific discipline 
could in many cases identify individuals if the specific committee were known. We also gave a 
commitment to respondents that we would not discuss survey data referring to individual 
committees.  Having the individual and not the committee as the unit of analysis means that when 
we give percentages, they should not be interpreted as directly reflecting the percentage of 
committees to which various attributes apply, but refer to the percentages of respondents to the 
survey. 
 
SACs as “hybrid” organizations 
SACs are not just about scientists.  They can be quite diverse bodies composed of different 
types of members or participants. The definition of what a “scientist” is cannot be resolved here. 
However different committees have different provisions governing who can turn up and participate 
in them.  Of the 338 respondents to the survey, two-thirds (67 per cent) described themselves as 
“scientists or scientific experts”.  These will be referred to as “scientists” and those describing 
themselves as members of the committee in any other capacity as “non-scientists”. Of the scientists 
most were in life sciences (75 per cent) followed by physics, chemistry, maths and engineering (13 
per cent) and social sciences (9 per cent).    The 33 per cent of respondents who did not describe 
themselves as scientists, the “non-scientists”, included 22 per cent who described themselves as 
“professional practitioners”, 4 per cent as “lay” members and 3 per cent as representatives of 
groups or NGOs (the remaining 4 per cent put themselves in the “other” category).   The remarkably 
low representation of women on advisory committees suggested by our sample (28 per cent) is even 
lower among scientists (24 per cent) than non-scientists (38 per cent), a statistically significant 
difference (differences reported in this paper as significant are at the p<.05 level using a chi squared 
test). 
 
Of all the scientists responding to the survey, only one third (31 per cent) served on 
committees composed exclusively of scientists and without lay or “non-scientist” members. To say 
that such members are not scientists might, in fact, be misleading insofar as many of them 
responded that they had "familiarity with the scientific issues" covered by the committee before 
they were invited to join it. 75 per cent of the 105 we have for convenience labelled "non-scientists" 
told us they had an academic or professional qualification in the field, 63 per cent had practical 
experience in the field and 24 per cent said they had developed a familiarity with the field through 
other means; only 8 per cent said they had "no prior familiarity with the scientific issues" in the field 
of the committee before they became members.  Of the non-scientist respondents, a large 
proportion (79 per cent) saw themselves as there to "ensure that the interests of different 
stakeholders and affected parties are represented".  Other functions included taking care that "the 
language of the committee’s advice is clear and understandable (75 per cent), making sure 
"decisions of the committee are communicated effectively to all concerned" (59 per cent), 
preventing the discussion from becoming "too abstract and academic" (52 per cent) and giving 
greater weight and legitimacy to the decisions of the committee (44 per cent).   
 
The survey suggests that the presence of non-scientists in committee meetings is not merely 
symbolic.  Certainly the extent to which the language of committee discussions makes it easy for 
them to contribute seems to be variable, with 36 per cent agreeing that “Committee discussions are 
often conducted in technical scientific language that non-scientists find hard to understand”, an 
identical percentage disagreeing and 28 per cent saying they neither agree nor disagree.  However, 
72 per cent of the non-scientists agreed that “non-scientists on the committee are frequently able to 
argue and debate the technical issues alongside the scientists” (14 per cent disagreed, the 
remainder neither disagreed nor agreed) and 59 per cent agreed with the proposition that “the 
views of the non-scientists on the committee have a big impact on the conclusions we reach” (8 
percent disagreed, the remainder neither agreed nor disagreed).  As we will see below, there was no 
significant difference between scientists and non-scientists in their estimation of their own personal 
impact on committee decisions. 
 
Even though one-third of respondents are on committees without non-scientific or “lay” 
members, this proportion probably exaggerates the number of respondents on committees 
composed exclusively of scientists. Most respondents reported that their committees also have civil 
servants in attendance and participating.  Meetings are attended by members of the Committee 
Secretariat, the main role of which is putting together the agenda for the meeting and preparing the 
minutes.  Yet meetings are usually attended by other civil servants – only a handful of respondents 
(3 per cent) told us that, leaving aside members of the Secretariat, no civil servants attended their 
meetings. It appears common for civil servants to be full members of the committee; 38 per cent 
reported serving on a committee with civil servants as members, 37 per cent reported that officials 
other than those who are members attend all or most meetings and a further 22 per cent said civil 
servants attend “some” meetings.  Advisory Committees in general appear from their membership 
to contain “a dichotomy of the competing and simultaneous emphasis upon the technocratic bases 
of policy ('normal science') and the ethos of stakeholder engagement (or extended peer 
community)” (Timotijevic et al. 2013: 80) and as such may well be expected to go beyond just 
discussing “the science”.    
 The agendas of SACs 
The agendas of Committees appear to be predominantly set by the government departments 
or agencies they serve (Table 2). Almost all (92 per cent) respondents, including non-scientists, 
stated that the government department or agency was a source of the committee's agenda and 
four-fifths (79 per cent) said it was one of the two most important sources. Yet members of the 
committee are also a significant source of the agenda, with one third (34 per cent) describing it as 
one of the two most important.  The third most important source of SAC agendas according to our 
respondents was that which is "obligated" -- items referred to the committee as a matter of course 
as part of its established remit.  For example, the Commission on Human Medicines has to advise on 
licensing applications and on representations that applicants make.  On its own this finding does not 
really help us decide between the “on tap”, legitimising or policy bargaining functions of committees 
since in all of them the government’s agenda setting role is expected to be strong.  
Table 2 here 
We might be able to make some distinction between the three interpretations of the roles of 
SACs by looking at the different types of issues referred to them. The predominant description of 
what members spent their time discussing emphasised the importance of scientific issues, 
supporting the “on tap” perspective.  The respondents to the survey tended to agree that they were 
there to give general advice on the "state of scientific knowledge"; 85 per cent saw this as a "major 
part" of their work and only 2 per cent as not part of their work at all (Table 3).  Whether this advice 
referred to scanning the environment for “problems and opportunities that might require a policy 
response from government”, which we have labelled "blue skies thinking" in Table 3, or referred to 
implementation and casework was more variable. Two-thirds (64 per cent) described blue skies 
thinking as a major part of their work, only a third regarding implementation (39 per cent), casework 
(35 per cent) and detailed policy content (24 per cent) as a major part of their work. 
Table 3 here 
The evidence does not suggest that broader policy issues, those one would associate with a 
“legitimising” or “policy bargaining” role, were more likely to be placed on the agenda by 
government departments or agencies.  Respondents giving government agencies as one of the two 
most important sources of agenda issues were no more likely to report “blue skies” advice as a 
major type of issue referred to them than those who said their SAC agendas came predominantly 
from elsewhere. Using the same measure, the only significant bias from government as agenda 
setter as regards requests for the type of advice set out in Table 3 is that government appears less 
likely to refer implementation or casework issues to the SAC. It must be added that by this measure 
those giving “members of the committee” as one of the main sources of agenda items were also 
significantly less likely to say that their SAC discussed implementation issues. Such detail 
(implementation, detailed policy content and casework in Table 3 appears to arise from the 
obligated terms of reference of the committees.  Of all the sources of agenda items, the only 
significant correlation between agenda source and the preponderance of blue skies advice on the 
agenda can be found where those saying “another advisory body” or “another public body” was one 
of the main sources of their SAC agendas were also more likely to say that such blue skies issues 
were an important part of their work.  While statistically significant, it must be borne in mind that 
fewer than one in five respondents claimed either of these among the most important sources of 
agenda items.  
 
Deliberations in SACs 
As discussed above, the diversity of perspectives represented in a large proportion of 
committees -- lay, group representatives and civil servants, many of whom may be policy people – 
appears to be consistent with a policy deliberation role for SACs.  Moreover one of the features of 
policy advice often assumed to draw scientists away from considering the science alone and towards 
broader cues on which to base their suggestions, is also significantly present in the committees: 
uncertainty. While a large proportion of the scientist members of the committees (41 per cent) 
agreed that there is “little uncertainly” in the science usually discussed by their committee, a 
sizeable proportion disagreed (34 per cent); the remainder neither agreed nor disagreed.  However, 
one cannot simply extrapolate from such environmental circumstances that scientists are drawn into 
conducting debates over policy.  Faced with policy questions scientists can, and often do, prefer to 
keep away from offering anything other than judgments on the science (see Schwach et al 2007).  
 
Some scientists indicated that they use evaluative criteria that go beyond the directly 
relevant scientific evidence alone.  When asked, 33 per cent agreed with the proposition that "my 
own scientific advice is more often based on my judgment  than on specific pieces of research";  43 
per cent disagreed and the remainder neither disagreed nor agreed. Yet only a small portion of the 
scientists tended to bring policy or political criteria into the construction of their advice: 15 per cent 
agreed with the proposition that their advice needed to consider "what is politically feasible and not 
the science alone", with 73 per cent disagreeing. It must be added that the importance of political 
feasibility as a consideration is far less likely to be accepted by life scientists (11 per cent agreed with 
its importance for their advice) than those in physics, maths  and related disciplines (21 per cent) 
and social scientists (37 per cent). This finding does not, of course, tell us whether political feasibility 
is deliberately left out so that scientists just give “the science”, or whether it is not considered due to 
lack of appreciation of political constraints (see Lawton 2007: 465).  
 
Over two-thirds of scientists,  69 per cent,  claimed never to have been lobbied by outside 
interests, 20 per cent had been lobbied "once or twice" and 11 per cent more than that. Those that 
had been lobbied more often were, unexpectedly,  somewhat less likely to argue that “need to 
consider what is politically feasible and not science alone”, but this was not statistically significant.   
In giving advice, scientists predominantly reported that they could stick to the science, a feature that 
does not support the proposal that SACs engage in broader forms of policy deliberation. 
 
What kind of discussion takes place in the meetings?  Our evidence can only give a broad 
indication of the types of conflicts that might emerge given the diversity of scientific and non-
scientific participants in discussions (Table 4). Scientific disagreements appear to be common, but 
not a characteristic feature of discussions within the committees; while 88 per cent said they 
occurred sometimes ("less than half the time"), only 10 per cent said that they happened in the 
majority of discussions. And the often-suspected use of such committees to help continue academic 
disputes by "scoring points" off scientific colleagues seems rare, with four-fifths (79 per cent) never 
witnessing this. Scientists may act as advocates for a particular position, but few (4 per cent) thought 
this happened very frequently and 59 per cent said this never happened at all. Disagreements 
between scientists and non-scientists appear slightly more common than disagreements among 
scientists (15 per cent said they experienced them in the majority of discussions; the question was 
only posed to those where the committee contained non-scientist members), but a large proportion 
(35 per cent) also categorically stated that such conflicts never happened. 
Table 4 here 
Although the survey offers evidence of moderate levels of divergent views, especially among 
scientists and between scientist and lay members, the evidence is also striking that decisions are 
made on the basis of consensus: all respondents (100 per cent) stated that decisions were based on 
consensus more than half the time or always, not one respondent stated that consensus was less 
frequent than that.   
 
The question of how moderately diverse views can be brought to a largely consensual set of 
recommendations cannot be answered by our questionnaire alone.  Of course it is always possible 
that greater conflicts can play out in private meetings between scientists and politicians and officials 
rather than in the meetings themselves, as Smith (1995: 299) suggested was in the case in the 
Advisory Committee on Nutrition’s 1934 deliberations on nutritional standards. That does not 
detract from the central point that the SAC itself does not appear to be a forum for policy 
bargaining. The evidence that the presence of individuals and groups other than scientists in the 
committees generally turns them into politicised or even broader policy discussions is not strong.   
 
Taking the perceived role of government members of the committees in helping generate 
consensus as an indicator, the evidence for a “policy legitimising” role of SACs does not appear 
strong either. As Table 4 suggests, members believe that secretariats are predominantly neutral, 
with only 13 per cent suggesting they were neutral less than half the time. The evidence on the role 
of civil servants is slightly more supportive of a legitimising role.  The survey also asked whether the 
civil servants present (and the question did not distinguish between members of the secretariat and 
other civil servants attending the committee) can have a significant impact on decisions.  Only 14 per 
cent thought they did so more than half the time or always, 37 per cent never and 49 per cent 
sometimes.  Yet this does not support a view of legitimation being a prominent role of committees.  
Where civil servants have an impact it cannot be assumed that they steer the discussion towards a 
prescribed solution.  One respondent wrote that "the civil servants are very skilled at steering the 
group towards decisions that will not be troubling for the government, even without directly 
intervening in the formal discussions".  However, another offered a fundamentally different view of 
civil service influence and the relationship of science to policy; "In my experience [the] secretariat 
has an important influence in facilitating the discussion via background papers, draft statements etc. 
but aims to reflect the views of the Committee rather than pursue a preferred outcome. Hence yes, 
influential but neutral".  A third respondent's comments challenged the whole notion that, where 
influential, the civil servants' role can be characterised as making sure the decision is in line with 
established policy preferences:  
The science alone is still presented, but may often require acknowledgement that reliance on 
that advice may well go in a politically unacceptable direction.  In this fashion, first, common 
cause is made with the civil servants - who have to take political acceptability into account in 
the way that an advisory committee member need not.  Second, it presents a basis for the civil 
servant or other policy makers to develop and argue for a position which  challenges what is 
politically feasible. 
Civil servants play an important role in the deliberations of the committee, but this cannot on its 
own be accepted as firm evidence of them stewarding SACs in a “legitimising” role. 
 
We asked a question about the perceived personal influence of respondents on committee 
decisions.  In answer to the question of how often their own contribution shaped the deliberations 
of the committee, 12 per cent replied “always or nearly always”; 52 per cent “more than half the 
time”;  25 per cent “less than half the time” and 2 per cent “rarely or never” (5 per cent did not 
know).  Scientists were no more or less likely than non-scientists to claim such influence on 
deliberations.  The influence of SAC members by this measure did not appear to be reduced  when 
civil servants appeared on the scene – indeed those respondents on committees with civil servants 
(other than from the secretariat) in attendance at every meeting were significantly more likely (70 
per cent) to claim influence more than half the time or always than those very few (N=10) whose 
SACs were never attended by civil servants (30 per cent). Any perceived lack of neutrality of the 
secretariat had no effect on evaluations of personal influence. By these measures empirical  support 
for SACs filling a prominent “legitimising” role is not strong. 
 
Neither did a host of variables related to a policy deliberation role have any effect on 
perceived personal influence; whether there were non-scientists on the committee, whether the 
respondent tended to look “beyond the science” in framing advice, whether there was frequent 
disagreement between scientists and non-scientists.  What did affect personal efficacy? Those who 
spent more time on SAC business felt significantly greater efficacy (77 per cent claimed a high 
influence on deliberations if they spent a day a week or more on SAC business, compared with 53 
per cent that spent a day a month or less); those with longer service, for example 71 per cent of 
those with over 5 years service claimed a high influence while only 43 per cent of those with less 
than one year did so.  Gender made no difference to perceptions personal influence.  While we 
cannot claim to have “explained” variations in personal influence evaluations, they seem to be 
related more to how much individuals put into their work than any general committee characteristic 
arising from its role as scientific, policy legitimising or policy deliberation forum. 
 
We did not ask any questions about the role of the committee chair whose role is likely to be 
crucial in developing a consensual position.  Two  of the 124 comments written at the end of the 
survey spontaneously mentioned a dominant role of the chair in securing consensus, but the 
evidence that civil servants or chairs frequently seek to railroad members to support the kinds of 
conclusions they want them to reach is simply not there.  We must conclude that to a very large 
extent the consensus is natural or negotiated rather than manipulated or enforced. 
 
The impact of committee decisions 
Members of the committees believe the government follows the advice of the SAC they sit 
on: 85 per cent claim a high degree of influence, with 46 per cent saying government followed its 
advice “always or nearly always”, 39 per cent ” more than half the time” 8 per cent “less than half 
the time” -- the remaining 7 per cent said their committee only rarely gave advice. While this is not 
more consistent with any one of the three roles in particular, looking at the influence claimed by 
different groups does suggest that scientists are more likely to claim influence than others.  The 
percentage of respondents saying their advice was “always followed” did not vary between 
scientists and non-scientists.  However, the 63 non-scientists who were professional practitioners 
(many of these are likely to be medical practitioners though we did not specifically ask) were 
somewhat more likely (54 per cent) than the 206 scientists (46 per cent) to claim the committee 
advice was “always followed); both were significantly more likely than the 36 other non-scientists 
(33 per cent), to claim such impact for their conclusions.  
 
Life scientists were especially likely to report that the advice of their SACs was followed: 53 
per cent of life scientists said that their committee's advice was always followed compared with 26 
per cent of other scientists, a statistically significant difference.  Women scientists were somewhat 
more likely (50 per cent) to report higher levels of impact for their committees than men (43 per 
cent), but the low numbers (50 women to 161 men) and small difference mean that this is not 
statistically significant. The more scientists are asked to comment on specific cases and detail, the 
more likely they were to report a high impact for their committee: where "specific cases" were a 
"major part" of the committee's work, 56 per cent reported their recommendations were always 
followed compared with 40 per cent of those on committees for which it was a "minor part" and 33 
per cent for committees not dealing with specific cases at all.  Where scientists reported the science 
their committee tends to deal with is less certain they are less likely (38 per cent) to report such high 
impact of committee decisions than those who agreed that the science left little uncertainty (59 per 
cent).  That scientific agreement is strongly associated with impact is further suggested by the fact 
that those respondents who say that scientists “never” disagree were more likely to claim high 
influence for their committees.   
 
The importance of consensus for the impact of the committee is also underlined by the fact 
that those who reported consensus was "always or nearly always" achieved were more likely (52 per 
cent) than those who only reported consensus "more than half the time" (26 per cent) to say that 
their committee's decisions were "always followed". Reports of frequent disagreements among 
scientists were statistically significantly associated with lower perceptions of committee impact as 
were frequent disagreements between scientists and non-scientists, the latter offering some 
support for the “policy bargaining” model.  Support for the “legitimising” role is much weaker here. 
The question of whether advice was always followed was not significantly related to  perceptions of 
whether the secretariat was perceived as more or less frequently neutral or whether the civil 
servants were more or less active in shaping deliberations.  In fact, while not statistically significant, 
the respondents believing that civil servants “never” had a big impact on deliberations were more 
likely (51 per cent) to believe their advice was always followed than those who thought civil servants 
shaped things sometimes (44 per cent) or always (20 per cent). 
 
Conclusions 
On its own, a questionnaire survey of its members cannot explain how any advisory 
committee actually works.  Nevertheless, a survey of members of a range of committees allows us to 
identify some broad trends and does allow us to say that there is very little evidence that the mass 
of daily interactions between government and scientists follows either a “policy legitimising” or 
“policy deliberation” logic.  While there are bits of evidence that these functions can be filled at 
times by SACs, taking the mass of everyday interactions between government and scientists, 
advisory committees seem substantially more frequently to work according to the “on tap” model. 
Government might dominate the agenda of such committees, but one would expect this even with 
an “on tap” model where government looks to SACs for “the science” which policy makers rather 
than scientists turn into policy proposals or practice.  There is little evidence of a widespread 
tendency by government to seek to steer the committee deliberations in a particular policy 
direction. While civil servants do appear to have an influence on what SACs decide in a significant 
proportion of cases, we cannot necessarily describe their activity as pushing the scientists and other 
members of the committee towards a favoured set of proposals, as some of the respondents were 
at pains to tell us in the written comments discussed above. It is perhaps unsurprising that scientists 
are no more likely than anyone else to devote serious amounts of time to a largely ritual or 
tokenistic project like policy legitimation, and our evidence supports this argument. Undoubtedly it 
is quite possible that the few indications we had that secretariats, other civil servants or powerful 
chairs steer scientists towards making decisions consistent with their wishes rather than with the 
science, are more widespread than the survey responses asking for perceptions of influence 
indicate, not least because respondents may be unwilling or unable to acknowledge the degree to 
which their work is being steered.  All we can say is that the sparseness of the existing evidence that 
this railroading takes place suggests that it is highly unlikely that the consensus that seems to 
predominate in committee decision making is manufactured by such coercive or hegemonic 
mechanisms.  If this were happening to a significant extent, the bigger puzzle would be why 
scientists accept nomination to such committees and devote significant amounts of time on it (66 
per cent spend a day or more a month on their committee work). 
 
Neither is there much evidence that SACs draw scientists into a world of policy deliberation 
where they go beyond their scientific knowledge and develop broader policy skills, as suggested by 
the policy deliberation model.  SACs are hybrid in terms of their composition, but they seem in their 
operation and focus to concentrate on deliberating the science rather than seeking some form of 
agreement or accommodation between different social, economic and political interests. There is a 
some support for the idea that where the scientists disagree with the non-scientists, the SAC has less 
impact on government action, but this is perhaps the only small piece of evidence in its favour. 
 Does any of the evidence suggest that it would be mistaken to dismiss the “on top” argument 
that sees the possibility of SACs being vehicles for a new technocracy?   The efficacy of committees – 
the notion that the advice committees give is, according to its members, often followed – is perhaps 
the strongest evidence in support of this argument.  But as the evidence also suggests, this impact is 
more likely to be over matters of detail and implementation than over broad policy directions. We 
do not believe that there is much in the responses to our questionnaire that suggest a privileged 
place for a scientific elite in public policy making in Britain. 
 
Do we have any reason to think that these findings are a product of the survey methodology 
and reliance on the self-reported behaviour and opinions of SAC members?  The honest answer is 
that we cannot know. Some respondents suggested in their comments that SAC meetings were 
stitched up by policy people, but whether this means that this happened rather infrequently or that 
the bulk who suggested a more open exchange were either misguided in their evaluations or 
tailored their views to offer some sort of rosy view of how things work for an outsider cannot be 
settled here. It is possible that the findings are at variance with some of the case study-based 
analyses such as those of Krick (2015) and Dunlop (2010) because policy case studies tend to look at 
scientific advice on bigger ticket policy issues while our survey includes a mass of lower level advice 
on matters such as human reactions to veterinary medicines and appeals against revoked licenses 
for laboratories working on genetically modified organisms. 
 
In general, the traditional “on tap” model appears closer to the experience of how 
committees actually operate. While scientists often deliberate issues with representatives of 
professions and groups as well as policy civil servants in attendance, and while the science may be 
uncertain on many of the matters they discuss, only few scientists, one in seven, frame their advice 
taking political feasibility into account. Even fewer life scientists, one in ten, do this, and they make 
up three quarters of the scientists in the survey.  Consensus appears to be a very important decision 
rule for committees, both in the frequency with which respondents said it was found and in the 
importance consensus appears to have for explaining the consequent impact of committee 
decisions.  In just about as strong a manner as one could reasonably expect, the evidence attests to 
the general validity of the traditional model. 
 
Is this finding of an “on tap” role likely to be confined to the United Kingdom?  The 
“legitimising” and especially “policy bargaining” models around which we have structured our 
discussion are derived from the experience of other countries, above all  Germany and the European 
Union.  While we cannot here offer a cross-national comparative analysis of scientific advisory 
committees, we can point to some institutional features that appear to make SACs in the UK less 
likely to fulfil legitimising and bargaining roles.  Krick’s (2015) study, which suggests a strong 
“legitimising” role for committees, looks at German advisory committees with defined and 
moderately high-profile policy missions: to develop proposals for policy in areas such as migration 
policy and vocational education.  Her research suggests that one would be less likely to find a 
legitimising role, and more likely to find a substantive role (“instrumental”) closer to an “on tap” 
model, where the issues command less public attention. Because the world of SACs is one of low-
profile routine, higher profile policy and everything in between, it is likely that the high profile policy 
issues attracting more active government involvement of the kind found by Krick in some of her 
committees could be being dwarfed by the more routine science-policy interactions which she 
would expect to be characterised by such “instrumental” relations.  Furthermore, unlike both Krick’s 
German advisory bodies the emphasis in the institutional structure of SACs is on mobilising scientific 
advice rather than providing a “policy forum” in the form of “a knowledge exchange or negotiation 
venue for political, scientific, and corporate members dealing with these issues” (Fischer and Leifeld 
2015: 365) which might be expected to bring with it a policy bargaining function.  It is possible that 
the “on tap” model is especially applicable in our UK SAC case not primarily because of any cultural 
disposition of UK governments to treat scientists in a particular way, or of scientists to behave in a 
particular way, but because the bulk of science-policy interactions in SACs tend not to involve high-
profile policy issues.  This view is supported by the Rimutke and Haverlund’s (2015 :445) finding, 
based on a small survey of scientists routinely giving advice to European Commission DGs, as 
opposed to members of higher profile policy advisory committees, that “instrumental use of 
knowledge is dominant” in much the same way that the “on tap” model comes out most strongly in 
the UK. 
 
It is quite possible that wider features of the operation of SACs in the UK mask a legitimising 
function: government generally appoints SAC members and may choose members more likely to 
support the thrust of policy. Organisational turnover might over the longer term reinforce the 
strength of the “on tap” model.  At the time of our survey we learned that several listed committees 
no longer existed, or at least not in the form described.  We cannot rule out the possibility that 
committees that survive are likely to be those in which it is possible to maintain the “on tap” 
approach and those where it is not possible are reorganised or abandoned.   Thus McEldowney, 
Grant and Medley (2013: 99) suggest that the Badger Panel, set up 1996 to oversee the controversial 
badger cull aimed at reducing the incidence of tuberculosis in cattle, was disbanded in 2003 in part 
because the wide range of interests included in it, including conservation interests as well as 
scientists and veterinarians, meant that “it had not been easy to achieve a unified view” and the 
Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs came to believe that “the strategy of 
creating encompassing groups which attempted to reconcile differences between highly divergent 
positions” did not work and “reliance was placed on much smaller, inclusive groups”. 
 
Whether or not turnover and selective appointment are part of the story, the answer to the 
question of adaptation of scientists to the policy world, our research suggests,  is not to be found in 
scientists being pushed into a world subordinate to policy, where they simply legitimise government 
policy or discard significant amounts of scientific expertise to be able to bargain with other policy 
actors. Neither is it to be found in the internal mental struggles of scientists.  Whether they should 
be "honest brokers", "advocates" or "pure scientists", for example, is for Pielke (2005:10) largely a 
choice scientists make “in how they relate their work to policy and politics”.  Rather we would 
expect to find the answer in the structures and internal dynamics of the organization of the 
committees themselves: how the secretariats and chairs formulate the agendas such that scientific 
evidence and judgments do not have to second guess wider policy aspirations and constraints, how 
members of committees recognise and defer to the expertise and judgment of other members and 
how discussion is steered while maintaining sufficient confidence of members that their own 
perspective on the matter is not being sidelined.  Scientists are likely to be just as capable of going 
beyond the science and developing and offering normative views on policy issues of concern to 
them as any other person offering advice to government.  How SACs are structured, and how they 
work in practice, seem to make the expression and airing of conflicts about policy issues a less 
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Table 1: Outline of empirical expectations of different roles at different stages in SAC issue 
handling 
 
 Role               Stage of Issue Handling  
 
 
   Agenda Deliberation Impact 





as basis of advice 
Government follows 
advice contingent on 
agreement among 
scientists 
 Legitimising Government 
priority to broad 
policy issues 
Government 
"steering" of advice 
Government follows 
advice where it agrees 




priority to broad 
policy issues 
Policy compromises 
important for advice  
Government follows 




Table 2: Sources of SAC agendas 
                                                                                                     An important source         Among two most important 
sources 
 N % N % 
From a government department or agency 300 92 255 79 
From members of the committee 240 73 110 34 
Obligated 116 36 49 15 
From outside government 138 42 39 12 
From another advisory body 158 48 31 10 
From another public body 147 45 28 9 
Other 19 6 3 1 
 
  
Table 3: Types of advice SACs give 















Major part of work 85 64 39 35 27 24 37 
Minor part of work 13 28 40 19 39 43   8 
Not part of work   2   8 21 46 33 32 55 
N=322 
  
Table 4: Conflicts within SACs  
Percentage saying that … 
                     






The secretariat is neutral (N=312) 3 10 88 
The scientists disagree among themselves (N=310) 10 81 10 
Lay members tend to disagree with scientists (N=238) 35 60 15 
Some scientists act as advocates for a position (N=309) 59 37 4 
Some scientists score points off each other (N=309) 79 19 2 
 
 
